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A High Price to Compete: The
Feasibility and Effect of Waivers Used
to Protect Schools From Liability for
Injuries to Athletes With High Medical
Risks
INTRODUCTION
Americans are fanatic about sports. A phenomenon called
"funkionlust,"' or the "love of doing a thing," has accompanied
this fanaticism. As a result, athletes often will risk their own health
and safety in order to compete in their favorite sport. But "fun-
kionlust" is not the only motivation athletes feel to participate.
Economic considerations, institutional pressures, pride, and peer
pressure2 may all lead athletes to pursue athletic competition, ig-
noring potential harm to themselves.
3
The story of Hank Gathers illustrates the desire athletes feel to
participate in their chosen sport. Gathers, a basketball star at
Loyola Marymount Umversity, fainted during a game early in the
1989-90 season. He was diagnosed as having an irregular heartbeat.
Gathers loved basketball and continued to play despite the danger
concomitant to his condition. In March of 1990, he collapsed
during a basketball game and died.
4
Athletes who have been advised by doctors not to compete due
to serious medical conditions may attempt to persuade their schools
to allow them to compete regardless of the risk. Such athletes, and
even their parents, may offer to sign a liability waiver in an attempt
Crile, The Surgeon's Dilemma, Harper's, May 1975, at 38.
2 See Dodd, Who Decides Health Risk is Too High?, USA Today, Oct. 5, 1990, at
IC, col. 3 [hereinafter USA Today] (discussing Stephen Larkin's attempt to play high school
football despite warmngs that his heart condition could endanger his life); see also Garrity,
You Name It, They Play It, Sports Illus., May 13, 1985, at 62 (discussing the Larkin
brothers, three of whom were major college athletes and noting that a former Notre Dame
football coach called then twelve year old Stephen the best athlete in the family).
King, The Duty and Standard of Care for Team Physicians, 18 Hous. L. REv 657,
693 (1981).
4 Smith, Not What the Doctor Ordered, Sports Illus., June 11, 1990, at
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to absolve the school of any responsibility if the athlete is further
injured.
5
This situation creates a dilemma for the schools or school
districts involved. One option for the school is to accept the liability
waiver and allow the athletes to ignore medical recommendations
and risk serious injury by participating in athletic competition. If,
however, the school or school district allows the student to play
under a waiver, there is no guarantee that the waiver will fully
protect the school if the athlete is injured. 6 The alternative is to
refuse to allow the athlete to participate despite the waiver offer
and face the possibility of legal action from the disgruntled stu-
dent .
7
By allowing athletes to compete despite expert determinations
that their medical conditions should preclude such competition, the
schools are exposing these athletes to grave and potentially fatal
risks of injury.8 Additionally, the schools are exposing themselves
to possible litigation and liability 9
Part I of this Note discusses the concept of waivers, what may
be found in the agreements, and how waivers relate to athletic
participation.10 Part II looks at the various ways waivers can be
voided, including public policy reasons, repudiation by a minor,
or use of ambiguous terms." Part III exannnes the factors that
should be considered when deciding whether to allow an athlete to
5 Stephen Larkin and his parents provide an example. Stephen, a seventeen year old,
was prevented from playing high school football in the fall of 1990 due to a heart condition
known as hypertrophic canomyopathy, or thickemng of the heart muscle. The family was
willing to sign a waiver of liability even though all six cardiologists who examined the case
recommended that Stephen Larkin not play football. The United States Court of Appeals
affirmed a U.S. District Court decision denying the Larkin family request for a restraining
order to force Stephen's school to allow him to play. Larkin v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati,
No. 90-3893 (6th Cir. 1990); see also Smith, supra note 4 (examples of other athletes willing
to sign liability waivers in order to play).
6 H. APPENZLLR, SPoRTs & LAW 35 (1985); see infra notes 28-65 and accompanying
text.
See USA Today, supra note 2; see also Grube v. Bethlehem Area School Dist., 550
F Supp. 418 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (athlete with one kidney successful in enjoimng school from
precluding hun from playing interscholastic football after the school had rejected the
athlete's offer to sign a written waiver of all legal or financial responsibility of the school
in the event of injury).
See infra notes 61-105 and accompanying text.
, See Smith, supra note 4 (discussing the types of litigation initiated by athletes who
offer to sign liability waivers and the fear that the waivers will not hold up in court); see
also infra notes 28-65 and accompanying text.
1o See infra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 28-65 and accompanying text.
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participate, such as the rights as well as the health and safety of
the athlete. 12 Waivers serve a valuable function by informing the
athlete of the risks of the activity in which she wishes to participate.
But if the school considers what is in the best interest of the athlete
and exanunes its own potential liability, it must conclude that it
should not allow athletes that have serious medical problems to
participate. Athletes do not always act in their own best interest;
it sometimes falls to the school to insure a fatal mistake is not
made by the athlete or her parents.
13
I. WAIVERS
A waiver is an exculpatory agreement that relieves one party
of all or part of its responsibility to another.14 These waivers,
usually in the form of an express contractual agreement, 15 touch
off a conflict between contract law and tort law 16 Contract law is
17 See infra notes 61-103 and accompanying text.
13 See Id.
14 H. APPENZELLR, supra note 6, at 34.
1 A typical waiver looks like this:
I am aware that participation in this sport will be a dangerous activity
involving MANY RISKS OF INJURY. I understand the dangers and risks of
participating include, but are not limited to, death, serious neck or spinal
injury, which may result in paralysis, brain damage, serious injury to all
internal organs, injury to all bones, ligaments, muscles, tendons, and other
aspects of my body. I understand the dangers and risks of playing or practicing
may result not only in senous injury, but in senous impairment of future
ability to earn a living, engage in business, and generally enjoy life.
Because of the dangers of the sport, I understand the importance of
following the coaches' instructions regarding techmques, training and other
rules and agree to obey instructions.
In consideration for allowing me to participate, I hereby assume all the
risks associated with the sport and agree to hold the school district, its
employees or agents harmless from any and all liability, causes of action,
debts, claims, or demands of any nature whatsoever which may arise in
connection with my participation in any activities related to the team. The
terms hereof serve as a release and assumption of risk for my heirs, estate,
and for all members of my family.
I, as the parent/legal guardian, have read the above warning and release
and understand its terms. I understand the sport involves many risks, including
but not limited to those outlined above.
In consideration for the school district permitting my child to try out for
and ultimately participate with the team, I hereby agree to hold the school
district, its employees and agents harmless from any liability which may arise
in connection with participation of my child in activities related to the team.
The terms serve as a release.
2 R. BERRY & G. WoNo, LAw AND Busin;ss OF THE SPoRTs INDusnaais 414 (1986).
16 H. APPENzELLMR, supra note 6, at 34.
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based on the premise that persons should be able to make a binding
agreement as they see fit. 17 Tort law, on the other hand, is based
on the idea that a party should be held responsible for his wrongful
actions that cause injury to others.18 This conflict has led to some
confusion regarding the validity of waivers in situations such as
those discussed here.19
Courts have attempted to resolve this conflict through a general
principle that waivers will be enforced unless the agreement is
invalid as contrary to public policy2 or one party was clearly
dominant in the bargaining process. 21 But courts do not look
favorably upon these exculpatory agreements.22 Other factors also
may lead to a waiver being voided,2 including the fact that one of
the parties is a minor, a finding of fraud or misrepresentation, or
the existence of force or duress.2
When waivers are used in an attempt to protect schools from
liability for injuries suffered by students in athletic competition,
they generally include a statement that the athlete is aware of the
nsks of participation and assumes these risks. If a specific risk is
known, or if the athlete has a particular medical condition, this is
commonly specified in the waiver There will be a statement in the
waiver releasing the school or school district of all liability arising
from the particular risk or condition.25 The waiver also will include
17 Id.
"1 Id., see W KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON Tma LAW OF ToRTs 6 (5th ed. 1984).
19 G. NYGARD & T. BOONE, LAW FOR PHYSICAL EDUCATORs AND COACHES, 220 (1989).
2o REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 469(b); see also infra notes 28-51 and accom-
panying text; Wagenblast v. Odessa School Distnct, 758 P.2d. 968 (Wash. 1988) ("It has
been much easier for courts to simply declare releases violative of public policy than to
state a pnncipled reason for so holding.").
21 G. NYGARD & T. BOONE, supra note 19, at 225.
n Id.
21 See G. ScHUBERT, R. SmrrH & J. TRrNTADuE, SPORTS LAW 218, 219 (1986).
2 See infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
21 Such a specific waiver might look as follows:
I have been informed that I have the following physical conditions.
I have received a full explanation from the physician that to continue to
play may result in the detenoration or aggravation of such pre-existing physical
condition and render me physically incapacitated.
I fully understand the possible consequences of playing with the physical
conditions set forth above. Nevertheless, I desire to continue to play and
hereby assume the risk.
Because I desire to play, I hereby waive and release the school, coaches,
the school physician and its trainers from any and all liability in the event I
become physically unable to play because of a detenoration or aggravation of
the physical condition set forth above.
2 R. BERRY AND G. WONG, supra note 15, at 405.
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the signature of the athlete and the signature of the athlete's parent
or guardian, if she is a minor. Whether or not the waiver will be
effective in protecting the school from liability, 26 it is a method of
informing the athlete of the dangers of participation in an athletic
activity 27
II. REASONS FOR THE VOIDING OF ATHLETIC PARTICIPATION
LIABILITY WAIVERS
A. Waivers Void as Contrary to Public Policy
Liability waivers may be declared void as contrary to public
policy because "the public interest may not be waived."' ' In Tunkl
v Regents of University of California,29 the California Supreme
Court designed a test to determine when an exculpatory agreement
violates public policy. The test consists of six criteria: (1) the
agreement concerns an endeavor of a type generally thought suit-
able for public regulation; (2) the party seeking exculpation is
engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public,
which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members
of the public; (3) such party holds itself out as willing to perform
this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least
for any member of the public coming within certain established
standards; (4) the party seeking the exculpation possesses a decisive
advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public
who seeks the services; (5) in exercising a superior bargaining
power, the party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion
contract" of exculpation and makes no provision whereby those
receiving services may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain
protection against negligence; and (6) the person or members of
the public seeking such services must be placed under the control
of the furnisher of the services, subject to the risk of carelessness
2See infra notes 28-65 and accompanying text.
" See E. Bjorkum, Assumption of Risk and Its Effect on School Liability for Athletic
Injury, 55 EDuc. L. REP. (WEst) 349, 358 (Oct. 26, 1989).
2 See 28 Am. JuR 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 161 (1964); KEroN, supra note 18, at
482.
32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441 (1963).
10 An adhesion contract is a standardized contract offered on an essentially "take it
or leave it basis," without opportunity to bargain and under such conditions that the
consumer cannot obtain the desired service without agreeing. BLACK's LAW DIcTIoNARY 38
(5th ed. 1979).
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on the part of the furnisher, its employees, or its agents.31 All of
these factors were present in the Tunki case.1
2
In Wagenblast v Odessa School Distrct,33 the Tunki test was
applied to waivers releasing a school district from liability stemming
from athletic programs. The Seattle and Odessa school districts
had required all students and their parents or guardians to sign
standardized waiver forms as a precondition to the students' par-
ticipation in athletic activities. The Supreme Court of Washington
held that the requirement was impermissible because the waivers
violated public policy 34 The court found all of the criteria of the
Tunki test present.3 5 It said that (1) interscholastic sports in public
schools are a subject fit for public regulation; (2) interscholastic
sports in public schools are a matter of public importance; (3)
interscholastic sports programs are open to all students who meet
certain skill and eligibility requirements; (4) school districts possess
a clear and disparate bargaining strength when they insist the
waiver be signed; (5) any student that refuses to sign the waiver
will be barred from participation in interscholastic sports in public
schools; and (6) a school district owes a duty to its students to
anticipate reasonably foreseeable dangers. 36 In addition, the school
district has a duty to take precautions to protect the students from
those dangers, and the student, under the control of a coach, is
subject to the risk that the school district or its agent will breach
the duty 37 While the court did not assign weights to the six factors,
it noted that as the number of factors present increases, the agree-
ment is more likely to be declared invalid on public policy grounds."
The Wagenblast court also discussed the relationship between
the waivers and the doctrine of assumption of risk, concluding that
the two are basically similar.39 There may, however, be risks other
than the school district's negligence present in any athletic activ-
ity 4o If a student knowingly encounters one of these risks and still
3 Tunkl v. Regents of Umv. of Cal., 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 37-38, 383 P.2d 441, 445-46
(1963).
32 Tunkl, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d at 441.
31 Wagenblast v. Odessa School Dist., 758 P.2d 968, 971-73 (Wash. 1988).
See Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 970.
31 Id. at 972-73.
36 Id.
37 Id.
3Id. at 974.
39 Id.
40 Id. The court mentioned the possibility of the opponent's negligence and the
inherent dangerousness of the sport as some of the risks, other than the school's negligence,
that may be present.
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decides to play, it might be said that the student has voluntarily
assumed the risk.41 The court cautioned that the facts of the case
did not allow them to rule on that question.42
The court discussed the factors necessary to prove an express
assumption of risk: 43 (1) a full subjective understanding, (2) of the
presence and nature of the specific risk, and (3) a voluntary choice
to encounter the risk. It is therefore possible that a court would
apply the doctrine of assumption of risk, even though the waiver
itself may be void as violative of public policy. In that case, the
school would not be held liable. 44
It is unclear how the Wagenblast decision might apply to a
situation where a single athlete with a serious medical condition
wishes to sign a liability waiver in order to participate in athletic
competition. At least in Washington, there would be little problem
meeting the first three criteria of the Tunkl test, as it was found
that interscholastic sports are a fit subject for public regulation,
are a matter of public importance, and are open to all students
who meet certain eligibility requirements.45 In addition, the sixth
criterion also is met because the student is under the control of a
coach and is subject to the risk that the duty the school owes to
the athlete to anticipate reasonably forseeable dangers could be
breached.46
In Wagenblast, all athletes were required to sign a liability
waiver. In situations where only athletes with dangerous medical
conditions must sign waivers, any difference in application of the
Tunkl test would be in the fourth and fifth criteria of that test.
The school still might hold a clear and disparate advantage in
bargainmng power, and could constructively force the student to
sign the waiver.47 As it is unlikely that the athlete can participate
41 Id.
" Id. The court said the law of assumption of risk continues to evolve on a case-by-
case basis and that the facts before the court did not provide a basis to decide the question.
4 Id. (citing Kirk v. Washington State Umv., 746 P.2d 285 (Wash. 1987)).
" Assumption of risk doctnne has serious limitations as a defense against liability.
See E. Bjorkum, supra note 27, at 354-55.
41 Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 972.
4 Id.
47 The signing is constructively forced since the student will not be allowed to partic-
ipate unless there is a signed waiver. See Smith, supra note 5 (Long Beach State football
player and Central Connecticut State basketball player not allowed to compete unless waiver
was signed).
1990-91]
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in the sport elsewhere, the school still holds the kind of power
discussed in the fourth and fifth parts of the Tunkl test. 48
The waiver in a situation like this would not be standardized
like the waiver in Wagenblast. It is not standardized in the sense
that not all students are required to sign it in order to participate,
but it may be standardized in the sense that all students with
serious medical conditions sign the same waiver. The Wagenblast
court said that not all of the criteria of the Tunkl test need be met
to find a waiver violative of public policy 49 Instead, the analysis
will be done on a case-by-case basis. The more criteria met, the
greater the chance the waiver will be declared void as against public
policy 50 The problem with this analysis is that the court does not
weight the criteria or determine a mimmum number of criteria
necessary to declare the waiver void. There is also the question of
how to weigh the various criteria.5 1
Under the Wagenblast interpretation of the Tunkl test, it is
unclear how a waiver signed by one student that has a dangerous
medical condition would hold up if attacked as void as against
public policy The principle in Wagenblast and Tunkl appears to
be the same. The decision may depend on the court that hears the
case and the way it applies the Tunkl test to the situation. Perhaps
the Wagenblast court would void a waiver signed by one medically
unfit athlete since there is still uneven bargaining power, and the
athlete has little choice but to sign in order to participate, even if
the athlete volunteers to waive liability
B. Waivers Void for Other Reasons
In addition to public policy, there are other factors that may
cause a waiver to be found void. One factor that is particularly
pertinent to waivers of liability for interscholastic athletic partici-
pation is the contract principle that minors cannot be held to a
contract and may repudiate an otherwise valid agreement.5 2 Minors
may repudiate an agreement because they do not have the maturity
41 Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 973 (interscholastic competition possesses an "inherent
allure" that outside alternatives do not possess; in addition, many students cannot afford
private programs or schools where they may be able to compete).
49 Id.
50Id.
51 Note, Negligence-Exculpatory Clauses-School Districts Cannot Contract Out of
Negligence Liability In Interscholastic Athletics, 102 HARv L. REv 729 (1989).
12 H. APPENZELER, supra note 6, at 35.
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and knowledge to waive their right to hold the school district or
coaches liable.53 This factor is of obvious importance in interscho-
lastic athletics as most of the participants in secondary school
sports are minors.
Parents or guardians also are often required to sign these waiver
agreements. Generally, parents cannot waive the right of their
children to bring suit, although they may waive their own right to
sue.54 This principle renders the waivers signed by athletes who are
minors effectively useless.55
A waiver also may be voided if there was fraud or misrepre-
sentation within the agreement. 56 In determining whether fraud or
misrepresentation exists, it is important to determine whether the
waiving party had full knowledge of the terms of the agreement.
The terms of the waiver must be conspicuous, 57 and the language
must be specific and unambiguous in describing what liability is
being waived. 58 The waiver must result from a free and open
bargaining process. 59 Finally, waivers may be voided if force or
duress was used to obtain a signature on a waiver, the waiver was
unreasonable, or there was misconduct that was wanton, inten-
tional, or reckless. 60
If none of the above factors are present, then the waiver may
be upheld.6' This general proposition has been followed in cases
where exculpatory clauses have been signed by athletic partici-
pants. 62
Thus, it is clear that the mere presence of a liability waiver
often may not preclude an athlete from obtaining a judgment
" Id.
34 Id.
" Id. at 34-35; see also Santangelo v. City of New York, 411 N.Y.S.2d 666 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1978) Neither the minor nor his father were bound by a release signed by the
father, which purported to exempt the city and the athletic league from liability for injuries.
The father was not bound by the release because the derivative action "draws its life from
the existence of the causes of action which inures to the benefit of the infant."
mJ. WESTART & C. LownL, THE LAw oF SiPORTS 966 (1979).
57 Id.
" Id., see also U.C.C. § 1-201 (1987) ("a term is conspicuous when it is so written
that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it").
1' G. ScmmaT, R. Smrsn & J. TaENrADu, supra note 23, at 217-18.
60 H. APPENzEm.R, supra note 6, at 35.
6, See Williams v. Cox Enterprises, 283 S.E.2d. 367 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (upheld
waiver of liability covering running event since no factors necessary to void were present);
see also Garretson v. United States, 456 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1972) (upheld bar against
action by ski jumper who signed release of liability to tournament sponsors and who
previously had signed similar forms).
6See id.
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against a school district or school that allows the athlete to partic-
ipate despite contrary advice of a physician. 63 This is especially
true when the athlete is a minor." The waiver also must not be
void as against public policy or under any of the other factors
courts use to strike down the disfavored exculpatory agreements. 65
The fact that liability waivers may be declared void is one
important reason for wanness on the part of schools that allow
medically unfit athletes to participate in interscholastic athletics.
III. Tm RIGHT TO PLAY
Because waivers may inadequately protect schools against lia-
bility," they may choose to disallow altogether participation in
interscholastic athletics by medically unfit athletes. The student
may, however, possess rights that would make this choice unavail-
able.
A. The Right to Due Process
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees that no state may deprive a person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. 67 This amendment applies
only to state action, but it has been held that the regulations of
schools and school districts pertaimng to interscholastic athletic
competition are subject to the due process clause."
1. Procedural Due Process
If the school or school district institutes a policy barring from
competition athletes that are medically unfit, determination of
whether or not the athlete holds a property interest in participating
will be critical in evaluating the procedural due process protections
that will be afforded the athlete.
An athlete's interest in interscholastic athletic participation at
the high school level is generally not considered a property right.69
63 See supra notes 28-66 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
61 See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
"See supra notes 28-65 and accompanying text.
67 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
" R. BERRY & G. WoNo, supra note 15, at 55.
69 See Scott v. Kirkpatnck, 237 So. 2d 652 (Ala. 1970) (speculative possibility of
student acquiring college football scholarship no basis for finding student who was declared
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At the intercollegiate level, however, the athlete generally does
have a property right in such participation.70 The difference in
treatment stems from the fact that most college athletes receive a
present economc value in the form of a scholarship. 71 The lugh
school athlete has only the speculative potential for such a schol-
arship.72 In certain limited cases, however, even high school stu-
dents may have a property interest where the player has a very
good chance of receiving a college scholarship in his or her sport.73
If no property interest is found, the athlete is not entitled to
due process before being barred from participation. Conversely, if
a property interest is found, the athlete is entitled to due process. 74
2. Substantive Due Process
A key issue in substantive due process analysis is whether the
challenged government action is inconsistent with a "fundamental"
constitutional right.75 The Supreme Court has demed that a fun-
damental constitutional right to education exists,76 although some
states have recogmzed it as a "fundamental right" under their state
constitutions. 77 Even if a fundamental right to education were
found to exist, the question still remains whether or not that right
would include the right to participate in extra-cumcular athletic
activities. 78 The substantive due process concerns are discussed in
conjunction with equal protection concerns, in the following sec-
tion.
ineligible after transfer was deprived of property right); see also Florida High School
Activities Assoc. v. Thomas, 409 So. 2d 245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (while participation
in high school athletics is a pnvilege, the state cannot dispense with a pnvilege irrationally).
Where there are no fundamental constitutional principles involved, government has great
latitude over whom it will grant benefits. 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NowAK & J. YOUNo, TREATISE
ON CONSTTUTIONAL LAW SuBsTANCE AND PRoCEDURE 17.2 (1986) [heremafter R. ROTUNDA].
" Gulf South Conf. v. Boyd, 369 So. 2d 553 (Ala. 1979).
7, Id. at 556.
72 Id.
73 See Boyd v. Board of Dir. of McGhee School Dist., 612 F Supp. 86 (E.D. Ark.
1985) (student entitled to due process before coach could suspend him from team because
of good chance to receive athletic scholarship).
74 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 488 U.S. 564 (1972). See generally R. ROTUNDA,
supra note 69, at § 13.5.
15 R. BERRY & G. WONo, supra note 15, at 60.
76 See San Antomo Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
77 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929 (1976); Rose v.
Council for Better Education, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
71 See R. BERRY & G. WONO, supra note 15, at 61 (many courts interpret educational
rights as encompassing only in-class learmng).
1990-91]
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B. Substantive Claims
1. Equal Protection
The fourteenth amendment also declares that no state shall
deny any person equal protection of the laws. 79 Generally, the
equal protection clause prohibits invidious discrimination. No in-
dividual or group may be singled out for disparate treatment unless
it is the result of constitutionally permissible governmental action.80
If government action impedes a fundamental right, or discrim-
inates among persons based on suspect criteria, strict scrutiny is
used in reviewing the constitutionality of that action under due
process or equal protection analysis, respectively 81 Since education
generally does not implicate a fundamental right,82 and since med-
ically unfit student athletes are unlikely to be considered a suspect
class83 for equal protection analysis, it would be difficult for an
athlete to claim that strict scrutiny should be applied in reviewing
a school's decision to bar him or her from participating in inter-
scholastic athletics.
If there is neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right
involved, the government action need only be rationally related to
a legitimate governmental purpose.84 This is a much lower standard
than strict scrutiny and an easier one for the government to meet.
When a school bars a medically unfit student athlete from
participating, the governmental purpose appears to be two-fold.
The school is concerned about its own liability if the athlete is
injured, 5 but it also is concerned about the health, safety, and
11 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
o R. ROTUNDA, supra note 69, at § 14.1.
R. BERRY & G. WONG, supra note 15, at 63. Strict scrutiny requires the rule to be
supported by a compelling state interest-one with a value great enough to allow limitation
of a fundamental right. R. ROTUNDA, supra note 68, at § 14.3.
2 See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
" See generally L. TRmE, AM ERcAN CoNsTITUTIoNAL LAW 1465-1553 (2d ed. 1988).
Suspect classification has, for the most part, been limited to cases of race and alienage.
Suspectness is based, among other things, upon how frequently the class is subjected to
prejudice and discrimination.
" R. ROTUNDA, supra note 68, at § 14.3. In addition to the strict scrutiny and rational
relationship tests, an intermediate scrutiny test exists. This test covers cases involving, most
importantly, gender-based classifications. This test requires the law have substantial rela-
tionship to an important governmental interest.
85 See Grube v. Bethlehem Area School Dist., 550 F Supp. 418, 424 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(school refused to allow athlete with one kidney to participate).
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well-being of the athlete. 6 A rule barring the athlete from partic-
ipating is rationally related to both of these legitimate state inter-
ests. If the athlete is medically unfit for interscholastic athletics,
then allowing him to participate therein clearly would increase the
school's potential for liability and increase the likelihood that the
health of the athlete would be jeopardized. In addition, such a
rule does not appear to trigger other equal protection concerns of
undennclusiveness s7 or overmclusiveness. 8 The scope of the restric-
tion strictly conforms to the scope of the problem.
2. Rehabilitation Act
A different analysis applies if the athlete is considered handi-
capped or disabled. 9 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
197390 makes it unlawful for anyone receiving federal funding to
discrimnate against otherwise qualified individuals on the basis of
a handicap.91 In Poole v South Plainfield Board of Education,92
the parents of a handicapped child knew of the dangers involved
in their child's participation in athletics when he had only one
kidney. Indeed, the parents even encouraged his participation. The
court stated that in such a case, the school district could not deny
the student's right to participate. 93 The court also stated that the
purpose of section 504 is to allow handicapped individuals to live
life as fully as they are able without authorities determining what
is too risky 94 In this case, two medical experts qualified the athlete
" Id.
" An underinclusive rule is one that does not include all who are similarly situated
with respect to a rule, and burdens less than would be logical to achieve the purpose. If a
rule is underinclusive, it may be constitutionally infirm. See L. TiE, supra note 83, at
1447.
, An overinclusive rule is one that burdens those who would be spared if they had
enough power to compel normal attention. See id.
0 See Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
90 Id.
91 Id. Section 504 provides that
No otherwise qualified, handicapped individual in the United States
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in,
be demed the benefits of, or be subject to discnrmination under any program
or activity receiving Federal Financial assistance.
92 490 F Supp. 948 (D.C.N.J. 1980) (high school student with one kidney allowed to
participate in interscholastic wrestling despite school's objection).
9' Id. at 951-53.
9 Id. at 950.
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to participate. 95 The court did not indicate how it would have ruled
absent such medical clearance.
Athletes have been allowed to compete with one kidney, 96 one
eye,97 and various other handicaps, but only upon a showing of
substantial medical evidence that no serious risk of further injury
exists.98 The courts in these cases have given greater weight to the
medical recommendations and have decided that the school's con-
cern for the safety of the athlete and for avoiding liability is
outweighed by the medical testimony that an athlete could partic-
ipate.9
The "otherwise qualified"'1'0 language of section 504 could be
interpreted to mean that the athlete has been cleared to participate
by a medical expert. If the athlete has been declared unfit to play,
a school could argue that the athlete is not "otherwise qualified"
and therefore can be barred from participating.' 0'
3. Other Substantive Grounds
There are other grounds upon which an athlete ight attack a
school's decision to bar bum from participation in interscholastic
athletics. An athlete ight successfully claim that the decision to
bar his participation was not based on a "rational medical evalu-
ation of the existence of a nsk."' 10 2
An attack might be made on the ground that the relevant rules
were promulgated by an athletic association rather than the school
itself. Courts are reluctant, however, to overrule the rules and
regulations of an athletic association that pertain to eligibility so
long as the rules and regulations protect the athlete, promote
education, and continue amateurism. 0 3
" Id. at 952. The clearance was given by the family physician and a doctor from a
sports medicine center.
96 Grube, 550 F Supp. 418.
97 Wright v. Columbia Umv., 520 F Supp. 789 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
" See Grube, 550 F Supp. at 421 (testimony that the risk to the remaimng kidney of
the athlete is minute, almost nil).
Spitalen v. Nyquist, 345 N.Y.S.2d 878 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
'9 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). "An otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet
all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap." See also Southeastern Comm.
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979).
1o Davis, 442 U.S. at 406.
112 See Grube, 550 F Supp. at 424 (school district's decision to prohibit an athlete's
participation lacked a medical basis since the physicians relied upon did not have sufficient
facts to allow for a rational medical evaluation).
1o W CMmPION, FuNDAmENTALs OF SPORTS LAW 295 (1990); see Scott, 237 So. 2d at
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Finally, the rules can be neither arbitrary nor irrational,' °4 and
are subject to a viable challenge if they are the "result of fraud,
lack of jurisdiction, collusion, or arbitranness."105
CONCLUSION
Many high school and college students foresee a major role for
interscholastic athletics in their futures. The lure of financial re-
ward may, however, lead some athletes to try to participate in the
face of grave medical risks. °6 The schools these athletes attend
have an interest both in protecting the health and safety of the
athlete and in mimnzing their own potential liability 107
Such schools may attempt to require the athlete and his or her
parents to sign a waiver of liability, or the schools may attempt to
bar the athlete from participation altogether. There are risks that
may leave the school exposed to liability under either course of
action.1 08
No matter what course of action the schools take, they should
insure that there is adequate instruction and proper medical atten-
tion and advice for the athletes. Simply nummizing the risks will
aid in avoiding liability In the end, however, schools must always
have the utmost concern for the well-being of the athlete. Athletes
do not always make the best decisions.109 Schools should be delib-
erate when allowing athletes to make these potentially life or death
decisions.
Andrew Manno
"' See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
Scott, 237 So. 2d at 655.
106 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
,07 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
101 See supra notes 14-27 and 66-105 and accompanying text.
109 Central Connecticut State Umversity allowed Tony Penny to play basketball after
he signed a liability waiver despite a heart irregularity. Penny collapsed and died during a
professional game m England at the age of 23. Hank Gathers, a basketball star for Loyola
Marymount Umversity, collapsed during a game and died in March of 1990. Gathers had
fainted in an earlier game and had been diagnosed as having a heart condition, but he
continued to play. See Smith, supra note 5.
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